Fighting Joe Hooker's Rise and Fall as Commander of the Army of the Potomac

The Army of the Potomac in the early years of the Civil War was a well-equipped, fully manned, and imposing fighting force, but Lincoln appeared to suffer from incompetent commanders. His first choice, the later disgraced General George B. McClellan, was a capable trainer and organizer, but his overly cautious manner hampered the army’s ability to land a crushing blow against Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan’s grand plan to defeat the Confederacy and move down to Richmond resulted in the disastrous Peninsula Campaign of March-July 1862. 

Lincoln didn’t officially sack McClellan in the summer of 1862, but moved much of his command to John Pope’s Army of Virginia. The Army of Virginia’s catastrophic defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run led to McClellan’s repeated rise. Mac failed to follow up his victory at Antietam with a decisive destruction of the Confederate forces, costing him his job. The next man up, Ambrose Burnside, fared terribly at The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 11-15, 1862. Burnside needed replacing.

Burnside’s replacement was a man with strong political connections, Major General Fighting Joe Hooker. Hooker was a capable Brigade and Division commander, who was known for his aggressive nature. Politicians in Washington were wary of cautious generals like McClellan. They believed the aggressive man, known as “Fighting Joe,” would be an ideal replacement to decide the war's outcome in 1863.

General Joseph Hooker on one of his horses. The horse in this picture is possibly his horse "Billy." Photo was taken by Mathew Brady, sometime between 1861-65.

On paper Hooker looked to be a reasonable option for command. He was a 1837 graduate of West Point, graduating 29th in a class of 50. He was a veteran of the Seminole Wars and served on both Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor’s staffs during the Mexican-American War. After the Mexican-American War, he served in various military posts, resigning his commission in 1853. Through rigorous self-promotion at the onset of the Civil War, Hooker garnered an appointment to the rank of Brigadier General in 1861. By 1862, he commanded the II Division of the III Corps, and after the Second Battle of Bull Run in late summer 1862, he was promoted to command III Corps.

 Hooker’s rise to command of the Army of the Potomac was not, however, based solely on merit. After resigning his commission in 1853, he moved to California, where he warmed up to many Californian politicians, beginning a life-long practice of schmoozing the political elite. Hooker formed a long-term relationship with eventual Oregon Senator James Willis Nesmith, and at the onset of the Civil War, his desperate push for a major command, forced him to seek out the help of other U.S. Senators. Hooker even eventually married the sister of Ohio Congressman William Groesbeck. After the disasterous early campaigns of the war, Hooker’s outspoken criticism of McClellan and Burnside earned him the admiration of radical Republican politicians and he formed a relationship with Treasury Secretary Salmon P.Chase. Chase was another radical Republican, and one of Lincoln’s political rivals, who wanted an aggressive Union commander who could pressure a quicker end to the war, leading to his support for Fighting Joe Hooker.

General Joseph Hooker is pictured wearing his Major General's uniform as depicted by the two stars on his shoulder-boards.

Hooker’s political leanings tended to align with Democrats, but he was an ardent abolitionist. With democrats falling out of favor in Lincoln’s administration, he fell in with the radical Republicans who were pressuring a quick end to the war, with the final goal being the abolition of slavery. This arm of Lincoln’s political party was an essential ally for the President’s future, making Hooker’s connection to them beneficial for his rise in the Union Army. 

Hooker’s political connections coupled well with his ability for self-promotion. He cultivated relationships with journalists. The General was known for his charm and charisma, making him an easily promoted figure amongst the war-weary public. It was the press who coined his moniker “Fighting Joe” during the 1862 Peninsula Campaign. Everything seemed to mesh as a precursor to his meteoric rise, but his reputation wasn’t entirely positive.

This 1890 print depicting the Battle of Chancellorsville shows the scene of Stonewall Jackson's wounding, a wound that would prove fatal. Painting: The Battle of Chancellorsville by Kurz & Allison, 1890 (Library of Congress, Item #91482103, Digital ID: pga 01844 //hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/pga.01844

After continuous Union defeats early in the Eastern Campaign of the Civil War, the American people needed a hero to look up to, and the political leadership of America needed an able commander. Hooker’s ability to garner press coverage gave Americans the dashing fighter they needed and the politicians a figure they could attach to as a way to draw up public support for continuing the war.

Hooker was known as a brash and arrogant officer, who came across as bombastic, and even as a peddler of fiction at times. The self-proseletyzing officer was known to publicly roll his fellow officers, criticizing them to strengthen his image. Hooker also had a penchant for drinking, gambling, and was a known womanizer, dating back to his West Point days. Plenty of politicians in Washington strongly opposed Hooker’s playing of politics to earn his command.

Despite any misgivings and rumors surrounding Hooker’s rise to command, he was, indeed an able and brave military commander. Hooker was known for his aggressive, fearless demeanor in battle, and his capabilities as a Brigade and Corps commander was ample experience for his eventual promotion. His politician and press connections did help him get over the proverbial hump, but he was by no means a purely “political general.”

Remember, before the Civil War, there were fewer than ten active officers with the rank of General. No pre-war officer had ever held a large command along the lines of a division, corps, or army in the field. Hooker’s lacking experience in commanding an Army of over 150,000 was no fault of his, as this was the case for most officers during the Civil War. 

President Abraham Lincoln had plenty of reservations surrounding Hooker’s appointment to command. He criticized Hooker’s readiness to publicly attack his superior officers, and was aware the General had a strained relationship with former overall commander Winfield Scott. Hooker came across as overly-ambitious and Lincoln was hesitant due to Hooker’s political posturing, but the President had to retain support from Chase’s faction, so he appointed Hooker to command the Army of the Potomac on January 26, 1863.

Hooker concocted an eloborate plan to draw Lee out of his fortifications surrounding Fredericksburg, VA, into an open battle in April, 1863, but the ambitious plan fell apart. The complicated plan entailed splitting Hooker’s forces up, with one part, under command of General John Sedewick, pinning down Lee’s forces at Fredericksburg, while sending 10,000 Union Cavalry into the Confederate territory to raid Lee’s supply lines and draw the Confederate forces away from their defenses. A large portion of his army would move toward Chancellorsville and hopefully turn Lee’s flank. Hooker ruined his own chances of success. 

Hooker’s plan seemed to kick off with success between April 27-May 1, 1863. Hooker had the clear numerical advantage around Chancellorsville, but one moment of hesitation cost him the battle. On May 1st, Hooker ran into Stonewall Jackson’s Corps, signaling that Lee was moving his forces to confront Hooker’s larger force. The Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac did the unthinkable, withdrawing back to defensive positions, thus sparking the end of his tenure as overall commander. Hooker’s cautious maneuver filled Lee with confidence and gave him the opportunity to make a move.

Despite Lee’s numerical inferiority, he bested Hooker by flanking the Army of the Potomac with men from Jackson’s corps. Hooker’s right flank caved in on May 2nd, 1863, routing Hooker’s XI Corps. The attack ruined any potential for a Union Victory.

Hooker’s designed Cavalry Raid was a disaster, as poor weather, inconclusive orders, and caution by Stoneman ruined the potential for any success by the massive cavalry force. John Sedgewick did capture the heights around Fredericksburg on May 2, 1863, but from there his assault slowed. The lacking communication between Hooker and Sedgewick gave Lee the time to deal with the main assault around Chancellorsville, before turning to deal with Sedgewick.

On May 3, 1863 a flying Confederate cannonball slammed into a porch where Hooker stood, knocking him unconscious. Despite having a concussion and wandering in a daze, Hooker refused to relinquish command to his second and on May 4th, Hooker was forced to retreat once again. The Battle of Chancellorsville was one of Lee’s most decisive victories.

In the end, Hooker suffered from the same ailment that affected his predecessors, indecision and loss of confidence. Hooker’s “factor” that made him most enticing to the higher-ups was his aggressive nature, but when faced with the opportunity to prove himself, he collapsed. The General’s crucial decision to withdraw to defensive positions has given him an unfortunate reputation that has added to the mythology surrounding him. His withdrawal wasn’t the cause of cowardice or poor soldiering. At Chancellorsville, Hooker was facing off against the premier general of the Civil War who had a reputation that emanated throughout Union ranks. He suffered from poor intelligence and what intelligence he had, Hooker didn’t fully heed on May 2nd, when he should have better prepared for Lee’s flanking moves. In totality, Hooker likely believed the master in Robert E. Lee was besting him.  

Lincoln, naturally, was floored by the results. Hooker had outnumbered Lee by over double the Confederate forces. The president already had reservations about Hooker’s potential as an overall commander and the defeat only confirmed the writing already on the wall. Lincoln started to search for a replacement, while keeping the news from Hooker. 

Publicly, Lincoln supported Hooker and offered encouragement. He pushed the General to continue a piecemeal destruction of Lee’s forces, but Hooker’s plans for a major action were all rejected. The General seemed more concerned with capturing Richmond, rather than destroying Lee’s army, which would have left Washington, D.C., open to Confederate assault. Many of Hooker’s plans were dismissed, and Lincoln quietly passed management of Hooker off to General in Chief Henry Halleck. Halleck already had a tenuous relationship with Hooker and soundly rejected Hooker’s later plans while Lincoln sought a new commander.

Hooker’s growing insecurity made him frantically search for a new way to win over the president’s support. After Chancellorsville, Hooker was aware of Lee’s plans to invade the North. Knowing that Lee needed supplies, Hooker was concerned with the Confederate Cavalry force, over 9,000-strong, gathering in Culpeper Virginia. Expecting Lee’s Cavalry under the command of JEB Stuart to raid his supply lines, Hooker planned a counter-assault under the command of Alfred Pleasanton.

Eleven thousand Union cavalrymen were sent along to destroy Stuart’s potential raiding party before it could begin on June 9, 1863. Hooker hoped the destruction of Lee’s cavalry forces would serve as a way to win back Lincoln’s favor and the Union forces caught Stuart’s by surprise. The largest cavalry battle of the war to date took place around Brandy Station, Virginia. The fighting continued throughout the day. Stuart held his ground despite being caught off guard by the Union attack. Casualties were relatively light considering the size and duration of fighting, but Hooker felt he stifled future Confederate attempts to raid the North. While Lincoln was pleasantly surprised by the raid and the aggressiveness on Hooker’s part, he still replaced Hooker with General George Meade as Commander of the Army of the Potomac on June 28, 1863.

Hooker’s tenure as overall commander was just as disastrous as those who came before him. Meade was successful at Gettysburg in July of 1863, but overall command was ultimately given to  General Ulysses Grant in March 1864.

Hooker’s time as a Civil War General didn’t end in 1863. He was moved out west where he commanded the XX Corps under the command of Ulysses Grant and later General William Sherman in the West. Hooker performed admirably during his time in the Western Theater. Hooker later resigned from the Western Department due to a disagreement over command of the Army of the Tennessee and was put in command of the Northern Department from October 1, 1864 until the war’s end.

The defeat at Chancellorsville was crushing, but Hooker did have a positive effect on the Army of the Potomac. He reinvigorated the army’s morale after the disaster at Fredericksburg. He focused on the well-being of his soldiers, focusing on hygiene, better food, cleaner camps, etc. He created a centralized Bureau of Military Information that was needed to standardize military intelligence. Despite the inconclusive result at Brandy Station, the Union Cavalry earned a tremendous reputational boost from the battle, being seen for the first time as an equal to the superior Confederate Cavalry. Hooker’s net benefits were greater than this list, showing that he still contributed to the betterment of his soldiers despite the mess at Chancellorsville.